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Assessing the vulnerability of targets for burglary. Creating a multi-level observational 
instrument. 
 
M.P. Peeters, Ghent University. 
 
Many empirical studies on burglary focus on environmental characteristics, more specifically 
on non-observable factors like residential mobility and income. However, since burglars 
cannot observe these characteristics, why would they use them in the target selection 
process? Environmental research mostly looks at the macro level, the neighbourhood, or the 
micro level, the house. The meso level, the street, has been researched less often. A gap in 
previous research lies in the combination of multiple levels. The interaction effect between the 
neighbourhood, the street and the house has hardly been researched, while all these levels 
are taken into account when a burglar selects a target. This paper addresses the construction 
and pilot test of an observational instrument at neighbourhood, street and house level for the 
observation of stable environmental factors. The instrument presented in this paper can be 
used in further research to examine the influence of environmental characteristics on target 
selection by burglars. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Target selection by burglars 
 
How burglars select their targets has been the topic of much research. There are three main 
lines of research that have attempted to identify predominant factors which influence burglary 
target selection. The first line focuses on the role of socio-demographic factors as macro-place 
targets like income, residential mobility and ethnicity. Results show that the proportion of 
minorities (Shover, 1991), the density of the population (Tseloni, Wittebrood, Farrell & 
Pease, 2004) and the deprivation or affluence of the neighbourhood (Mawby, 2001) influence 
burglary rates.  
 
The second line of research utilises self-reports from burglars on micro-characteristics of 
suitable targets for burglary. This provides valuable information on visible characteristics that 
influence the selection process (Nee & Meenaghan, 2006; Verwee, Ponsaers & Enhus, 2007).  
The third research line that sheds light on burglary target selection relies on the observation of 
properties and the streets on which they are located. Observational research looks at 
characteristics of houses and their environment, and their influence on crime and burglary 
(Armitage, Monchuk & Rogerson, 2011).  
 
Although these bodies of research provide valuable insight into factors that influence burglary 
target selection, there are some limitations. Research that uses secondary databases on income 
and residential mobility gives insight into general characteristics of the environment that 
influence target selection, but is distant from the burglar on the street. A burglar does not say 
he has chosen a certain neighbourhood because the level of social cohesion seemed low 
(Bennett & Wright, 1984a). Instead, burglars mention visible, observable characteristics (Nee 
& Meenaghan, 2006; Verwee et al., 2007). Interview and observational research stays closer 
to actual target selection on the micro level, though rationalization during an interview may 
reveal characteristics that are not taken into account when searching for a target (Cromwell, 
Olson & Avary, 1991; Walsh, 1986). A limitation of observational research is that one cannot 
be certain that what a researcher observes is the same as what a burglar sees. When 
observational research was tested with householders, they appeared unaware of a range of 
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cues a burglar uses to choose a preferred house (Nee, 2003). Burglars walk around the streets, 
deliberately or subconsciously observing the environment looking for a suitable target. This 
search can be purely observational, or partly based on knowledge about behaviour or the 
activities of residents. Ninety-two per cent of burglars do some form of planning. While 
young burglars and addicts find preparation less important, they do say environmental 
characteristics are essential in target selection (Verwee et al., 2007).   
 
The environmental features consist of stable (fixed) and unstable (changeable) characteristics. 
Stable characteristics are more often related to characteristics of places than characteristics of 
people (Weisburd, Groff & Yang, 2012). Stable characteristics include physical 
characteristics of the properties like the type of dwelling and fencing. Unstable characteristics 
refer to variable features which are mostly indicators of occupancy such as whether or not the 
lights are on, or whether there is surveillance by neighbours or the police. While unstable 
characteristics influence the target selection process, they are extremely difficult to observe 
after a house has been burgled. If unstable factors like locks are included in an observation, 
this might lead to the conclusion that houses which have been burgled have more locks than 
those which have not. Since the timing of the installation of the locks is unknown, this 
conclusion might not be valid because - and this is a real possibility - the locks may have been 
installed after the burglary took place. The situation at the time of the burglary remains 
unknown. Therefore unstable factors are difficult to study by observational research if that 
research is not conducted at the time of the burglary. 
 
When looking at environmental features in criminal location selection, it is not just the house 
that is important. The combination of cues on one property is related to the neighbouring 
properties (Nee, 2003). As such, the target selection process can be seen as a spatially 
structured, hierarchical, sequential choice process (e.g. Vandeviver & Van Daele, 2012; 
Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984; Kleemans, 1996). This means that the target choice is 
made at several levels. It starts with the selection of an area with which the offender is 
familiar. This area can be a neighbourhood. In this neighbourhood the offender chooses a 
suitable street, followed by the selection of a suitable house (Kleemans, 1996). The smaller 
the level, the more details are included in the decision (Bennett & Wright, 1984a). This 
sequential choice perspective is adopted by many, and the importance of research on multiple 
spatial levels has been stressed before (Trickett, Osborn & Ellingworth, 1995; Tseloni, 
Osborn, Trickett & Pease, 2002). Lynch and Cantor (1992) included neighbourhood, street 
and house levels in their research on target selection. They found proof of the sequential 
choice process, and that several opportunity variables affect the risk of burglary victimisation. 
There has been little further research integrating these multiple spatial levels. 
 
Limitations 
 
The limitations of previous research - these limits being the use of only secondary data or the 
inclusion of unstable characteristics and the absence of research on multiple levels - create a 
gap in current knowledge on target selection. This gap provides the rationale for the current 
study on burglary target selection. Since observational research stays close to the selection 
process of the burglar, an observational method was chosen. The issues related to observing 
unstable factors argue for the exclusion of unstable variables. Since a burglar takes aspects of 
multiple levels into account, this study also includes neighbourhood, street and house level 
characteristics.  
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The research project uses a multi-level approach, through which houses, their streets and 
neighbourhoods are observed by the use of an observational instrument. The goal is to 
conduct about 2,000 observations in the city of Ghent. Police data on burglary are available 
for Ghent. Half the houses which will be observed had been burgled - or had a burglary 
attempt - in 2010. By comparing environmental characteristics, this research hopes to shed 
some light on the influence of environmental characteristics in target selection by burglars. 
But before large scale observations can be conducted, an observational instrument is required.  
 
From previous research many instruments are available, but an instrument to conduct 
observations at neighbourhood, street and house level does not exist. For example, Reynald 
(2009) created a property observation checklist. The items on this list include for example 
parking facilities, surveillance and graffiti. The instrument is mainly focussed at the property 
level, and less on its environment. There are also observational instruments and checklists that 
look at both the property and the street it is in (Armitage, 2006; Armitage et al., 2011; 
Perkins, Wandersman, Rich & Taylor, 1993). But still, the neighbourhood is left out of 
observational instruments. The property and street items addressed in these instruments are 
adapted into a new instrument, which is comparable in structure and observed characteristics 
on all three levels. This paper focuses on the construction of this observational instrument. 
The instrument will be used in future research to conduct the observations required for the 
project on burglary target selection. This paper considers the following research question: ‘Is 
it possible to create an observational instrument based on existing literature to measure stable 
neighbourhood, street and house characteristics?’ 
 
The first step is to determine what needs to be included in the instrument. The next section of 
the paper presents an overview of those theories related to target selection. This is followed 
by a section which summarizes relevant research on target selection, from which the 
observational instrument has been created. The second step was to pilot test the instrument in 
Ghent, which led to some improvements in the instrument. To conclude, the final 
observational instrument on neighbourhood, street and house level is presented. This 
instrument can be found in the appendix.  
 
2. Theoretical framework 
When looking at target selection, several theories seem relevant. The sequential choice model 
of target selection is in line with the routine activities perspective, where a target for crime is 
selected in one's daily, non-criminal routine. For a crime to occur, the presence of a motivated 
offender needs to come together with a suitable target and the absence of a capable guardian 
(Cohen & Felson, 1979). Burglars choose their targets from within their own routine activity 
space when walking around on the street (Brantingham & Brantingham, 2008). This routine 
does not only include the house, but also streets and neighbourhoods.  
 
According to the rational choice perspective, the only determinant for crime is whether the 
costs exceed the benefits. When the costs of crime outweigh the benefits, the offender will 
make a rational decision not to offend (Cornish & Clarke, 1986). The factors that influence 
this selection can be found in different fields. These fields can be related to the area, like 
accessibility, or the time it takes to get there, or to the house, like occupancy and security 
measures (Hamilton-Smith & Kent, 2005). 
 
In a neighbourhood or street where the land use is diverse and the streets are accessible, one 
can expect many people. These people traverse the neighbourhood in their daily, non-criminal 
routine and this provides possibilities to spot a target. The defensible space theory also finds 
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that the fewer strangers reside in the area, the lower the chance of burglary. Since there are 
only a few strangers around, it is possible to keep an eye on the strangers in the area who can 
be potential burglars (Newman, 1972).The previous theories relate there being a large number 
of people to high levels of crime. On the other hand, the space syntax model states that a lot of 
people on the street reduce the chance of burglary since the number of potential guardians is 
large (Hillier, 2004).  
 
Newman’s theory on defensible space focuses besides accessibility and control on 
territoriality. Territoriality is the extent in which the space is public or private, and whether a 
potential offender will be willing to cross to the private area to commit a crime (Newman, 
1972). This distinction between public and private can be made by for example fencing. This 
keeps possible criminals out. Although fencing is related to territoriality, the type of fencing is 
also related to the guardianship principle of the routine activities theory. The guardianship 
principle is developed further in Reynald’s guardianship theory.  Not only the presence of 
guardians is important, but also whether they can exercise this guardianship. Whether these 
guardians are capable of monitoring the environment is related to visibility. When a guardian 
is present, but not able to see neighbouring houses, the guardian is not a capable guardian 
(Reynald, 2010). By looking at fencing around the house, and the visibility of the neighbours, 
this capable guardianship can be addressed.  
 
Another theory related to crime that looks at environmental characteristics is broken windows 
theory (Wilson & Kelling 1982). This theory states that the more decay, like garbage and 
graffiti, is present in the streets, the bigger the chance of further deterioration, which might 
lead to crime. Decay also includes maintenance of the houses themselves, and how affluent 
the environment of the house looks. Furthermore, this affluence is related to rational choice 
theory, where a maximum profit against the least effort is pursued. The more affluent the 
house looks, the higher the expected benefits and the larger the chance a house will be 
burgled. This shows that the different theories can be linked. 
 
From these theories, many relevant characteristics for target selection can be distinguished. In 
the next section of the paper, existing research will be presented. This will help to determine 
which characteristics need to be included in the instrument and which need not. First, the 
neighbourhood level will be discussed, followed by the street and finally the house level. 
  
3. Characteristics from previous research 
 
Some characteristics presented in the theories are relevant at more than one level. An example 
of this is visibility - whether people have a clear view of the houses around them or not. 
Visibility, which is mostly a house characteristic, is also relevant at the street level.  If all the 
houses in the street have high fencing, the visibility is low, even for the one house that does 
not have high fencing. Therefore, a visibility question is added at street and at house level, but 
it will only be explained at the level that comes first, the street level.   
 
Neighbourhood 
 
Wealth and maintenance 
 
Many neighbourhood characteristics are quite abstract, and therefore difficult to observe. For 
example, some scholars find no difference in burglary chances between wealthy and deprived 
neighbourhoods (Bernasco, 2006; Wright, Logie, & Decker, 1995), while burglars said they 
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prefer affluent properties (Rengert & Wasilchick, 2000). Wikström (1991) finds that burglary 
occurs disproportionally in areas of high socio-economic status, but others have argued that 
burglary rates are higher in deprived areas (Bernasco, 2009; Mawby, 2001; Millie, 2008). 
When multiple levels are included, prosperity at the house level seems to increase crime rates, 
while the wealth of an area decreases it (Tseloni et al., 2002). That affluence has an effect on 
burglary chances seems clear, though how it influences burglary chances is disputed. How 
wealthy the neighbourhood, street or house looks is included here, measured by a question 
about the amount of affluent houses.  
 
Signs of wealth related to maintenance seem to influence burglary risk (Wright & Logie, 
1988). Related to this is how the neighbourhood looks. Wilson and Kelling (1982) found that 
the look of a neighbourhood is important for the level of crime; visible decay and disorder can 
cause crime. Physical disorder is seen in graffiti, litter and housing abandonment or bad 
upkeep (Gesthuizen & Veldheer, 2009; Wilson & Kelling, 1982). Different types of physical 
disorder significantly increase burglary risk (Lynch & Cantor, 1992; Weisburg, Groff & 
Yang, 2012) and dilapidation of buildings is connected with high crime rates (Stark, 1987). 
While Rengert and Wasilchick (2000) stated that the neighbourhood should be maintained 
well to prevent crime, others have discovered that a well-kept garden increases burglary 
chances, and unkept paintwork reduces it, potentially being related to how affluent the house 
looks (Wright & Logie, 1988). On the other hand, Perkins et al. (1993) find no relation 
between incivilities and crime and delinquency and Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) 
discover only a limited correlation between physical disorder and police recorded burglary. 
There does not seem to be an agreement on the direction of the influence of maintenance on 
burglary chances. Since decay seems to have an influence, these characteristics will be 
measured at all levels. To measure maintenance, the overall level of cleanliness (litter, graffiti, 
vandalism), how well the houses and gardens are maintained and the number of abandoned 
buildings are observed, using among others the questions below. 
 
 
 
 
Type of buildings and facilities 
 
Kleemans (1996) and  Groff and La Vigne (2001) point to mixed land use as another factor 
that influences burglary chances. When a neighbourhood only has a residential function, few 
strangers reside in the area. This leads to a low number of potential burglars, and a high level 
of territoriality. Neighbourhoods that have more commercial activities (Lynch & Cantor, 
1992) and less non-residential properties (Perkins et al., 1993) have higher burglary chances. 
On the other hand, recent research finds that that there is no relation between mixed land use 
How many of the houses in the neighbourhood… 
 None   Half    All 
are well maintained □  □ □ □  □ □ □  
have maintained 
paintwork 
□  □ □ □  □ □ □  
 
How often do you see …  in the neighbourhood 
Garbage / litter small None 1-10  11-20  21-30  31-40  41-50  > 50  
Garbage / litter large None 1-10  11-20  21-30  31-40  41-50  > 50  
Graffiti small None 1-2  3-4  5-6  7-8  9-10  > 10  
Graffiti large None 1-2  3-4  5-6  7-8  9-10  > 10  
Signs of vandalism  None 1 2 3 4 5 > 5 
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and crime (Weisburd et al., 2012). It is interesting to know whether the neighbourhood is 
exclusively residential, or if there are facilities like shops, parks and industry present. Mixed 
land use also seems linked to higher rates of physical and social disorder (Sampson & 
Raudenbush, 1999). Facilities, even when they are not measured very accurately, show an 
influence on the community (Gesthuizen & Veldheer, 2009). Several attraction variables 
mentioned in literature are included, as well as a question regarding land use in the 
neighbourhood and street. At the house level, land use is measured by asking what type of 
building is situated next to the house, and what the distance to this building is. 
 
 
 
The last factor to take into account at the neighbourhood level is the type of houses. 
Neighbourhoods with a high percentage of single family houses are more attractive to 
burglars than neighbourhoods with many apartment buildings, probably since houses are quite 
accessible compared to apartments (Bernasco & Nieuwbeerta, 2005). Whether there are many 
single family houses or apartments is included in the instrument at both the neighbourhood 
and street level. 
 
Street segment 
 
Street infrastructure 
 
At the street level, Newman (1972) finds that the type of street influences the chance of 
burglary. Whether a street is a regular street, a dead end street or a cul-de-sac1 is important. 
Streets and neighbourhoods become more vulnerable as accessibility increases (Beavon, 
Brantingham & Brantingham, 1994; Hakim, Rengert & Shachmurove, 2001; Taylor, 2002) 
and when they are easy to pass through (Bevis & Nutter, 1977). Burglary rates are higher 
when footpaths are present (Bernasco, 2006). Although cul-de-sacs experience a lower 
burglary rate than other streets (Johnson & Bowers, 2010), so called leaky cul-de-sacs2 are the 
least safe design of residential housing (Armitage et al., 2011). These factors are added to the 
instrument in the following manner. 
 
 
                                                          
1  
 A dead end street with a circular area at the end which allows cars to turn around.  
2  
 As above, only with footpaths connecting the cul-de-sac to other streets. 
Type of street 
o Dead end street 
o Cul-de-sac (dead end street with a circular ‘bag’ on the end) 
o Leaky cul-de-sac (footpaths provide access to the dead end street) 
o Cross street 
 
Number of connecting footpaths / alleys (not included the streets) 
0 1  2 3 4 4+ connecting footpaths / alleys 
 
Is this service available in the neighbourhood? 
Library o Yes o No 
Police station o Yes o No 
Hospital o Yes o No 
 
Land use in the neighbourhood (4 = As much residential as commercial) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Only residential       Only commercial 
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Alongside the type of street and the number of footpaths, road networks and traffic flow are 
also related to accessibility. Accessibility of a street can be measured by the number of side 
streets that enter the street, and traffic flow by scoring the type of street, for example whether 
it is a feeder or a minor artery (Beavon et al., 1994). Accessibility is included in the 
instrument with a question on the number of connecting streets and the type of street. 
Furthermore, some other traffic flow questions are included, like whether vehicular traffic is 
allowed and whether the street is a one way street or not. 
 
The width of the street is important for accessibility and for surveillance as well. Even by 
1980, Cohen (in Anselin, Cohen, Cook, Gorr & Tita, 2000) notes that wide streets enhance 
crime. Another factor that is related to accessibility is public transport, which increases the 
chance of burglary (Groff & La Vigne, 2001). Therefore, the width of the street and the 
number of public transport lines that pass through the street are observed. 
 
 
 
Visibility 
 
Besides accessibility, detectability or the presence of cover is important when choosing a 
target. Any obstacle, like high shrubbery or fencing, which reduces the view of the house and 
the front door increases the chance of burglary (Bennett & Wright, 1984b; Chula Vista Police 
Department, 2001; Hamilton-Smith & Kent, 2005; Wright & Logie, 1988). In general, more 
cover that reduces visibility from the street towards the house increases burglary risk (Palmer, 
Holmes & Hollin, 2002; Shaw & Gifford, 1994; Taylor & Nee, 1988). Burglars avoid houses 
with adjacent house visibility (Brown, 1985), if the entrance of the house is visible to 
neighbours across the street (Bennett & Wright, 1984b) and mention shrubbery as a place to 
hide (Rengert & Wasilchick, 2000). Cromwell et al. (1991) and the Chula Vista Police 
Department (2001) confirm the influence of fencing, and mention that to reduce burglary, 
cutting a high fence to a maximum of 1 or 1.2 metres is the best tactic.  
 
To measure visibility, the percentage of houses with high (more than 1.6m) fencing and the 
visibility between houses are observed, as well as the number of buildings and visible front 
doors, since they might influence visibility. At the house level, fencing questions are specified 
including the height of the fence and its transparency, since solid fencing seems to facilitate 
successful burglaries (Chula Vista Police Department, 2001).  
 
Type of street (1) 
o Mostly local traffic 
o Small through traffic within a neighbourhood 
o Medium through traffic between neighbourhoods 
o Large through traffic between cities / villages 
o Highway 
 
Width of the street 
½  1 1½  2 2½ 3 3½ 4 4+ cars wide 
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A final factor that is found in research is the way cars can be parked. Houses with garages are 
the least vulnerable to burglary (Armitage et al., 2011; Cromwell et al., 1991) and houses with 
an open carport have a higher burglary risk, since it is easier to observe whether there is 
someone at home (Cromwell et al., 1991). Therefore a question on how a car can be parked is 
included at street and house level. 
 
 
 
House 
 
Physical and symbolic barriers 
 
The final level that is included is the house level. Burglars often make the choice to burgle a 
house when they are on the street (Bennett & Wright, 1984b), making factors that can be seen 
from a distance the most important (Winchester & Jackson, 1982). Whatever a burglar 
encounters when he or she gets closer to a house hardly affects the previously made decision 
to burgle. Therefore, security measures that cannot be seen from the street seem relatively 
unimportant (Cromwell et al., 1991; Wright et al., 1995). The number of alternative entrance 
points might be related to this (Cromwell et al., 1991). Some security measures are visible 
from the street, for example an alarm system, a camera or a dog.  
 
An alarm system can decrease the chance of burglary (e.g. Hakim et al., 2001; Nee & 
Meenaghan, 2006; Wright et al., 1995) and some burglars find it important to take into 
account when selecting a target (Garcia-Retamero & Dhami, 2009; Verwee et al., 2007). But 
there is only little evidence of their effect (Pascoe & Lawrence, 1998); this might be due to 
the high level of false alarms (Poyner & Webb, 1991). Poyner (1993) mentions that the 
presence of cameras can affect crime, though other research finds it has only limited influence 
(Hamilton-Smith & Kent, 2005; Verwee et al. 2007), just like motion sensor lights (Verwee et 
al., 2007). An alternative factor that is sometimes mentioned as a deterrent for burglary is the 
presence of a dog (Nee & Meenaghan, 2006; Verwee et al., 2007; Wright et al., 1995), while 
others  state that dogs do not deter burglars (Buck, Hakim & Rengert, 1993; Cromwell et al., 
1991; Logie, Wright & Decker, 1992). Signs of dog presence, like a dog house or a ‘Beware 
of the dog' sign are also considered security measures. Security bars and barricades can 
How can a car be parked at this house (multiple answers possible) 
o On the driveway / carport 
o In a garage beside the house 
o On the street 
o Separate parking lot in the street 
o Other, namely … 
How many of the houses in the street have high fencing (1.6 meter or higher) 
None   Half   All 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
Fencing present around the house 
o No 
o Yes, low fencing (sitting height) 
o Yes, medium fencing (easy to look over) 
o Yes, high fencing  (1.6 meter to 2 meter high) 
o Yes, fortressing (> 2 meter high) 
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reduce burglary, though it seems that they at best reduce the aesthetic value of the property 
(Schneider & Kitchen, 2007).  
 
Which security measures precisely work is not agreed, but evidence shows that target 
hardening generally works (Nee & Taylor, 1988). Houses without security measures have the 
greatest burglary risk (Millie, 2008). Therefore different types of security measures are 
included in the instrument. 
 
 
 
Besides the physical barriers raised by security measures, there are symbolic barriers that can 
influence burglary risks through territoriality. Non-burgled homes have more signs of 
ownership than burgled homes (Brown, 1985). This is included by observing the amount of 
flowers and the presence of welcome mats or lawn furniture. Also related to territoriality is 
the distance to the road, which influences burglary chances (Bennett & Wright, 1984b; 
Cromwell et al., 1991). If there is an area between the road and the house, this is either 
garden, or another ‘private area'. These territoriality factors are added. 
 
Type of house 
 
Another characteristic that can influence burglary is housing type (Kleemans, 2001). 
Detached houses have the highest burglary risk (Taylor & Nee, 1988), followed by semi-
detached, corner and terraced houses. High-rise buildings have the lowest burglary risk 
(Kleemans, 1996). This might be connected to the accessibility of the houses (Bernasco & 
Nieuwbeerta, 2005).  
 
Houses on the corner of the street have a higher chance of burglary (Groff & La Vigne, 2001; 
Hakim et al., 2001; Rengert & Wasilchick, 2000), supposedly because they offer more 
possibilities for escape (Rengert & Wasilchick, 2000), or that visibility by neighbours is 
blocked (Brown, 1985). Cromwell et al. (1991) also found that burgled residences were 
significantly more likely to be in sight of traffic lights. Stopping at a traffic light gives a 
burglar the opportunity to observe a potential target, thereby increasing the burglary risk of 
houses in sight of traffic lights. These risk factors are included in the instrument. 
 
Visible security measures present (multiple answers possible) 
□ No 
□ Yes, alarm system 
□ Yes, security camera 
□ Yes, climb in security pins at windows or roof gutter 
□ Yes, sign of dog presence, namely … 
□ Yes, other namely …. 
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4. The instrument 
 
The literature review above has led to an observational instrument at the neighbourhood, 
street and house levels. A large variety of factors is included in the instrument. At the 
neighbourhood level, these are factors concerning affluence, maintenance, decay and land use. 
At the street level the same characteristics are included, supplemented with questions about 
the type of street, accessibility, public transport, visibility and parking. At the house level 
questions are added about security measures and the type of house. Together they form an 
observational instrument of stable neighbourhood, street and house level characteristics that, 
according to previous research, influence burglary target selection. 
 
Before testing the instrument, the units of analysis need to be defined. The first is the 
neighbourhood, using standard NIS (National Institute for Statistics, Belgium) classified 
neighbourhoods. These classifications are determined based on population data and they are 
quite homogenous. By using this classification, future linking with available socio-
demographic factors remains possible. The second unit is the street segment3, which is a part 
of a street from one side street to the next side street. In some cases this will mean the whole 
street is part of the street segment, in others only a part4. Therefore a clear definition of what 
is classified as a street is needed; everything wider than four meters, including sidewalks is a 
street; everything narrower is an alley. If a street segment is part of a square, the whole square 
is part of the street segment. The other side of the square is the other side of the street 
segment. The final unit of analysis is the house. All addresses in Ghent are stored in a 
database, of which a random sample of addresses was drawn. The observed houses are the 
exact addresses that are derived from this database. 
 
Methodology  
 
Based on the literature review above, an observational instrument has been created. To 
determine whether the characteristics in the instrument can be observed, whether multiple 
observers come to the same result and whether adaptations in formulation or answer options 
are needed, the instrument has been tested. The pilot test was done on ten houses in Ghent, 
five in the city centre and five on the outskirts of the city. These two locations are chosen 
since there are different environmental characteristics present in the city centre and the 
                                                          
3  
 Street and street segment are used interchangeably. 
4  
 When a street starts at a square, and continues until a T-crossing the whole street is the street segment. When 
there is a side street somewhere between the square and the T-crossing, the street has two street segments, one 
from the square to the side street and one from the side street to the T-crossing. The properties on both sides on 
the street are included. This is the same method as was used by for example Perkins et al. (1993) and Weisburd 
et al., (2012). 
Type of dwelling 
o Detached house 
o Semi-detached house 
o Row house 
o High rise building 
o Other, … 
 
Is the house a corner house 
o Yes 
o No 
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outskirts of the city. Observing both makes it possible to test the full range of the instrument. 
All levels were observed; this means that the houses, their street segments as well as their 
neighbourhoods were observed. The pilot test was conducted by eight observers, colleagues at 
Ghent University. Each location was observed by five people5. This leads to a total of 50 
house observations. Since the goal of this pilot was to determine the reliability and clarity of 
the instrument and not the influence of the environmental characteristics on burglary, this 
number is large enough. Six observers performed the observations by bike, one by scooter and 
one by car. 
 
Since burglars might be more sensitive to some environmental characteristics related to 
burglary target selection than the observers, the instrument is based on previous literature on 
burglary target selection. By using the same factors burglars said they take into account, the 
observations can stay closest to the actual target selection of the burglar. The results of the 
pilot were analysed using SPSS. Inter-rater reliability analysis was conducted on all variables, 
using intra-class correlations.  Ideally, the outcome of an intra-class correlation is an alpha 
above 0.8, but an alpha above 0.6 is generally accepted (Bijleveld, 2007). Due to the small 
number of observations in this pilot, an alpha of 0.7 is desired, though some leniency is taken 
into account. After the pilot test, the instrument has been adapted and clarified based on the 
results. The improved instrument was tested again by three observers, to make sure the 
instrument is ready for large scale use. The following section presents the most important 
results of both pilots. Unless otherwise specified, the alpha presented is from the second pilot.  
 
5. Results 
 
Neighbourhood level 
 
At the neighbourhood level, Pilot I showed that there were problems with abstract variables 
like affluence and maintenance. Perceptions of whether a house was ‘affluent', and 
‘maintained' were not consistent across raters. These variables were then clarified by, for 
example specifying when a house is maintained6, which improved the reliability of 
maintenance of paintwork to 0.840 and the maintenance of the neighbourhood to 0.744. 
Affluence and the maintenance of the houses both improved to 0.676.  
 
The land use in the neighbourhood (0.733) and whether houses are detached or not (0.979) 
were reliable, like the questions on which facilities are present. The type of dwelling was not 
reliable in Pilot I. This question asked about the distribution between single family houses and 
‘apartment blocks', while ‘apartments' would have been better since it also includes 
apartments in row houses. The change to ‘apartments' improved reliability to 0.804.  
 
Regarding the questions about ‘decay', counting items of decay seems problematic. There was 
more garbage lying around than expected, leading to a small variance in scores7. The garbage 
question has been adapted to a more abstract answer option, rating from ‘none' (1) through 
‘some' (4) to ‘a lot' (7) of garbage. For graffiti, the answer options were broadened. Instead of 
                                                          
5  
 Three observers observed the city centre and three the outskirts. Two observers observed both locations. 
6  
 All clarifications can be found in the full instrument that is attached. 
7  
 On the other hand, two observers scored no decay. This could have been due to the fact that they observed by 
car or scooter, thereby seeing less than on foot or by bike. The mode of transport seems to influence the results; 
therefore, all further observations will be conducted on a bike. 
13 
a maximum score of >10 graffiti, it was changed to >50. This improved reliability of decay 
factors in Pilot II8, in which all alphas were above 0.889. 
 
Related to decay is the amount of abandoned shops. The alpha in Pilot I was low. During the 
observations, it proved difficult to determine whether an abandoned building is a shop or 
something else. But this difference seems irrelevant. The question  is whether there is decay 
through abandoned buildings, not whether it is a shop or a house. Therefore, the question is 
adapted to ‘how many abandoned buildings are present', improving reliability to 0.833. 
 
Finally, some questions have been added after Pilot I. Although the amount of decay is 
important, some neighbourhoods are very clean, but have one place with a lot of graffiti or 
garbage (for example under a viaduct) which can give a distorted image. Therefore, the 
distribution of garbage over the neighbourhood has been added. These questions were all 
reliable in the second pilot. 
 
Street segment level 
 
At the street level, several small problems with reliability occurred. Some of these seemed to 
come from an error in the instrument, instead of ‘street segment' it mentioned ‘street', leading 
to observations of different parts of the street. Correcting this improved reliability for the 
number of connecting streets (0.723) and footpaths (1.000) and the number of buildings 
(0.847) and front doors (0.863) onto the street. 
 
Some problems that existed at the neighbourhood level were also present at the street level. 
Clarification of the concepts improved reliability for maintenance of houses (0.753), 
maintenance of paintwork (0.731), general maintenance (0.777) and dwelling type (0.888). 
The land use in the street (0.899) and whether houses are detached or not (0.979) were 
reliable, just like which facilities are present in the street.  
 
As at neighbourhood level, measuring decay at the street level shows little variance. The 
answer options were adapted, improving reliability above 0.796 for all questions. For several 
other questions, the explanation was unclear. A clearer specification of the concepts improved 
reliability. For example with the type of street (0.743), width of the street (it is made clearer 
that the pavement is excluded, 0.755), fencing (0.742) and visibility (0.829) reliability 
improved. The type of street (0.933) and the questions on the type of traffic were all reliable, 
as were the questions on parking facilities. 
 
Unfortunately, some questions still posed problems after adaptation and were removed from 
the instrument. The length of the street segment was scored differently by every observer. The 
large discrepancy resulted in the exclusion of this characteristic, which should be measured 
digitally. The question regarding houses that have windows with a good view wasalso 
removed, since this question was not reliable (0.071), and further clarification did not solve 
this. The distribution of front doors in the street segment was adapted after Pilot I, but this 
correction did not improve reliability (-0.226). This factor seems not to be clear enough to 
measure and the question was excluded.  
 
House level 
 
                                                          
8  
 One observer was excluded since no decay was scored. 
14 
The final level is the house level. Maintenance of the house (0.792) and the paintwork (0.749) 
were reliable, just as at the neighbourhood and street levels. Measuring decay remained 
problematic with an alpha around 0.500, even with the adaptations made after Pilot I. But the 
absolute difference is only between 0 and 1 pieces of garbage on the floor and graffiti or 
vandalism on the house. Therefore, the questions were not discarded, but the observations 
must be conducted with great focus, so no signs of decay will be missed.  
 
The question ‘what is located next to the house' was not reliable in Pilot I. This was due to the 
fact that there was no option for corner houses. An answer option for a corner house was 
added, improving reliability to 0.975.  
 
In Pilot I the reliability of security measures was good, but some security measures were 
added in Pilot II. Motion sensor lights that were excluded since they were regarded as not 
observable, appeared quite visible, and were therefore included after all. Also, speech 
intercom and speech intercoms with camera were included, since they were present a lot in 
the city centre, mostly on apartments. In Pilot II, all security measures scored reliably. 
 
Visible house characteristics, like the type of house (0.891), the number of floors (0.965), the 
questions about fencing (above 0.900) and the distance to the neighbours (0.992) showed high 
reliability between observers. The same applies to the questions related to parking facilities.  
Lastly, the variables that mark territoriality, like the presence of a welcome mat, flowers and 
furniture were difficult to observe and seems to be influenced by weather and season. Since 
there was also doubt about the stability and added value of these variables next to the general 
questions about maintenance, the questions are excluded, which completes the instrument. 
 
6. Conclusion and discussion 
 
A gap in the previous research on target selection is that observational studies have either 
used secondary data at the macro level, or carried out observations at the house and street 
level. Research that has looked systematically at the interaction between multiple spatial 
levels is scarce. To be able to conduct such a study, an observational instrument to measure 
neighbourhood, street and house level characteristics was created. The question addressed in 
this study was whether it is possible to create an observational instrument based on existing 
literature to measure stable neighbourhood, street and house characteristics. 
 
A literature review provided many characteristics that can influence burglary target selection, 
which were then combined into an observational instrument. Even though not all variables 
first included proved to be able to be measured, most variables withstood the pilot tests. The 
main adaptations were clarifications of the abstract characteristics which improved reliability, 
though decay remains difficult to measure. This might be related to the somewhat unstable 
nature of decay. Since the differences were only small the items are included, but must be 
conducted with focus to ensure reliable measurements.  
 
As addressed in the introduction, every research has its limitations. For this specific research, 
the exclusion of unstable characteristics is a limitation, although the chosen methods make 
this necessary. For observational research in general, the limitations lie in whether one can 
actually see what a burglar sees, and how the environment influences the observer. By 
creating the observational instrument based on characteristics from previous research, the risk 
of not seeing what a burglar sees is limited, because a structured observational tool is used. 
The use of this tool also reduces the risk of influence between the environment and the 
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observer (Semmens, 2011), though it is not totally absent. This has been seen in the pilot. In 
the city, conducting the observations with many people walking by was perceived as 
somewhat peculiar, while observing in the outskirts where the observer stood out felt 
uncomfortable. As an observer it is important to remain calm and focused during the 
observations, and not to rush because of any uncomfortable feeling. Every observation stands 
on its own, and requires focus, attention and time.  
 
Further research 
 
This observational instrument will be used in further research to conduct observations of 
about 2,000 houses in Ghent, the street segments and the neighbourhoods the houses are in. 
The data resulting from these observations will be used in different ways. 
 
The first step is an analysis of the characteristics of burgled and not-burgled houses. This 
makes it possible to determine whether houses that are burgled look different than houses that 
are not-burgled, and whether their environment looks different. These analyses also make it 
possible to determine which level, the house, the street or the neighbourhood, is most 
important when it comes to target selection. 
 
The second step is to determine whether house that are burgled once look different than 
houses that are burgled multiple times. There are more repeat burglaries than expected 
(Kleemans, 2001), and this risk seems to be transferred to dwellings nearby (Johnson et al., 
2007). Although repeat and near-repeat burglary are important topics in burglary research, 
this process is hardly linked with environmental characteristics. It is suggested that repeat 
burglaries occur since burglars themselves come back after a previous burglary, or because 
they have heard from others. Future research will address whether repeat and near-repeat 
burglary perhaps occur due to similar environmental characteristics, instead of based on 
previous knowledge of the burglar. 
 
Besides analyses of the observational data, several other factors will be included. This is done 
to compare the influence of observational data in relation to non-observational data. The 
factors that are included are socio-demographic factors like neighbourhood income and  
ethnicity. This analysis will also be conducted to determine whether some areas are more 
prone to repeat or near-repeat burglary than others. This combination can give a broad, in 
depth insight into factors that influence burglary target selection. 
 
To conclude, the observational instrument presented in this paper has the potential to become 
a full scale instrument to observe stable neighbourhood, street and house characteristics. The 
instrument will be used in an ongoing research project on burglary target selection, to fill a 
gap in present research on burglary target selection. The use of this instrument might reveal 
interaction between different levels of burglary target selection. 
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Appendix  The observational instrument 
 
Score list Neighbourhood characteristics 
 
Name of the neighbourhood __________________________________________ 
 
Is this service available in the neighbourhood? 
Library o Yes o No 
Police station o Yes o No 
Hospital o Yes o No 
Train station o Yes o No 
City Hall1 o Yes o No 
Shopping mall / street o Yes o No 
Hotel / bed and breakfast o Yes o No 
Industry o Yes o No 
Petrol station o Yes o No 
House of prayer (church / mosque etc.) o Yes o No 
Catering establishments o Yes o No 
School (all levels) o Yes o No 
Sport facilities o Yes o No 
Night shop o Yes o No 
Offices o Yes o No 
 
Land use in the neighbourhood  (4 = As much residential as commercial) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Only residential       Only commercial 
 
Categorization of dwellings in the neighbourhood (4= As much single family houses as apartments) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Only single family houses      Only apartments2 
 
How many of the … 
 None   Half    All 
Houses are detached or 
semi-detached houses3 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  
Houses look affluent4  □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
 
How many of the houses in the neighbourhood… 
 None   Half    All 
are well maintained5 □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
have maintained paintwork6 □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
have a garden that is ≥5m 
deep in front of house 
□ No gardens 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  
have a maintained garden7 □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
                                                          
1
 Also small offices in communities for small administration, like a passport or drivers license.  
2
 Apartment is not necessarily an apartment building, also apartments in houses. It is about the people that live there, 
not the building) 
3
 A detached house is at all sides detached from the neighbors, a semi-detached house has one neighbor attached.  
4
 Affluent looks like they have more than average money to spend. Take size, maintenance and location etc. of the 
house into account. 
5
 A maintained house = well done paintwork, bricks and stonework are in good shape, as is the roof. A less than 
maintained house has paintwork flaking off, several missing bricks and / or missing roof tiles etc. 
6
 Maintained paintwork = does not flake off, or needs to be redone. If no paintwork (the frames are of aluminum or 
synthetic), score the maintenance level of that. Also take cleanliness of the paintwork into account. 
Observation number: 
Observer:  
Date: ___-___-201_ 
Time: ___u___ 
Weather:   
22 
□ No gardens 
 
How many buildings are 
abandoned / empty / under 
construction 
None 1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 > 10 
 
How often do you see …  in the neighbourhood 
 
Distribution9 of … over the neighbourhood 
 Not present All in one 
place 
Mostly in one 
place 
Concentrated 
in a few places 
(Quite) equally 
spread 
Garbage / litter small8 □  □  □  □  □  
Garbage / litter large □  □  □  □  □  
Graffiti small9 □  □  □  □  □  
Graffiti large □  □  □  □  □  
Signs of vandalism10  □  □  □  □  □  
 
 Poor   Average   High 
standar
d 
What is the general level of 
the maintenance of the 
neighbourhood 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  
 
Room for striking comments about the neighbourhood 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
7
 Maintained garden = no or little weed, trees and bushed trimmed etc. of the garden that is visible from the street. If 
you score none, all houses have less than maintained gardens, if you score all, all houses have at least a maintained 
garden. 
 
8
 Small / large garbage. Small is smaller than a cola / beer can, large is everything larger. Small / large graffiti. Small 
is smaller than a sheet of A4 paper, large is everything larger. Vandalism is for example a broken or thrown over 
letterbox or bin, smashed windows or garbage set on fire. 
9
 Is there one place where there is a lot of garbage / graffiti / vandalism, or is it quite equally spread over the 
neighbourhood? When there is only 1 place with garbage etc., it is ‘all in one place’. If there are 2, it is ‘concentrated 
in a few places’, with more, it can also be ‘mostly in one place’ or ‘(quite) equally spread. 
 None   Some   A lot 
Garbage / litter small8 □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
Garbage / litter large □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
Graffiti small None 1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 > 50 
Graffiti large None 1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 > 50 
Signs of vandalism None 1 2 3 4 5 > 5 
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Score list Street segment characteristics 
 
Name of the street segment _________________________________________ 
 
House numbers on the street segment EVEN: ________________ ODD: _____________ 
 
Is this service available in the street segment? 
Library o Yes o No 
Police station o Yes o No 
School o Yes o No 
High school o Yes o No 
Hospital o Yes o No 
Train station o Yes o No 
Public transport stop (bus, tram etc.) o Yes o No 
City Hall10 o Yes o No 
Supermarket o Yes o No 
ATM o Yes o No 
Small retail shop (bakery, butcher, hairdresser 
etc.)11 
o Yes o No 
Large retail shop  (clothing store, department store, 
etc.) 
o Yes o No 
Night shop o Yes o No 
Shopping mall / street o Yes o No 
Hotel o Yes o No 
Restaurant o Yes o No 
Cafe o Yes o No 
Park o Yes o No 
Afforestation12  o Yes o No 
Industry o Yes o No 
Offices o Yes o No 
Petrol station o Yes o No 
House of prayer (church / mosque etc.) o Yes o No 
Pharmacy o Yes o No 
Sports facilities o Yes o No 
 
Land use in the street segment  (4 = As much residential as commercial) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Only residential       Only commercial 
 
Categorization of dwellings in the street segment (4= As much single family houses as apartments) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Only single family houses      Only apartments13 
 
How many of the houses … 
 None   Half    All 
are detached or semi-
detached houses14 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  
look affluent 15 □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
                                                          
10
 Also small offices in communities for small administration, like a passport or drivers license. 
11
 Small retail shop = door + < 2 windows. Large is more than 2 windows. 
12
 Other green, like a forest, grassland (for cows etc.) or smaller public green areas – not parks or a few flower beds 
13
 Apartment is not necessarily an apartment building, also apartments in houses. It is about the people that live there, 
not the building) 
14
 A detached house is at all sides detached from the neighbours, a semi-detached house has one neighbor attached. 
Observation number: 
Observer:  
Date: ___-___-201_ 
Time: ___u___ 
Weather:  
24 
 
Type of street segment (1) 
o No traffic allowed 
o Mostly local traffic (local traffic within a neighbourhood) 
o Small through traffic within a neighbourhood (larger road within neighbourhood, that ‘collects’ traffic) 
o Medium through traffic between neighbourhoods (delivers traffic between neighbourhoods) 
o Large through traffic between cities / villages 
o Highway 
 
Type of street segment (2) 
o Dead end street 
o Leaky dead end street (footpaths provide access to the dead end street) 
o Cul-de-sac (dead end street with a circular ‘bag’ on the end) 
o Leaky cul-de-sac (footpaths provide access to the dead end street) 
o Cross street 
 
Is the street segment part of a square? 
o Yes  
o No 
 
Are cars allowed in the street (watch traffic signs) 
o Not allowed 
o Only public transport allowed 
o One way traffic 
o Two way traffic 
 
Only local traffic allowed (watch traffic signs) 
o No traffic allowed 
o Yes 
o No 
 
Number of connecting street segments (street segment is > 4 meters wide) 
2 3 4 5 6 6+ connecting streetsegments 
 
Number of connecting footpaths / alleys (footpath or alley is < 4 meters wide) 
0 1  2 3 4 4+ connecting footpaths / alleys 
 
Width of the street segment without including pavement, but including parking spaces on the road 
½  1 1½  2 2 ½  3  3½  4 4+ cars wide 
 
Number of buildings in the street segment16 ____ buildings 
 
Number of front doors on street segment you can see from the street ____ front doors 
 
How many of the … in the street segment 
 None   Half   All 
Houses have high fencing 
(fencing of 1.6 meter or higher) 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  
Houses have unobstructed view 
from the front door of minimal 
2 neighbours front doors 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
15
 Affluent looks like they have more than average money to spend. Take size, maintenance and location etc. of the 
house into account. 
16
 Building =  all living or working constructions in the street segment; do not include garages or sheds. 
25 
How many of the houses / buildings in the street segment have facilities to park a car… 
 None 
(0%) 
  Half 
(50%) 
  All 
(100%) 
On the driveway / carport □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
In a garage beside the house □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
On the street (allowed and 
possible without disturbing 
traffic) 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  
On parking lot in street segment □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
Other, namely … □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
 
How often do you see …  in the street segment 
 
How many of the houses in the street segment … 
 None   Half    All 
are well maintained18 □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
have maintained 
paintwork19 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  
that have a garden, have a 
maintained garden 20 
□ No gardens 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  
 
How many buildings are 
abandoned / empty / under 
construction 
None 1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 > 10 
 
 Poor   Average     High 
standard 
What is the general level of 
the maintenance of the street 
segment 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  
 
Public transport line (bus, tram, etc.) passes through the street segment 
o No 
o Yes,  1 2 3 4 4+ lines 
 
Room for striking comments about the street segment 
 
 
 
                                                          
17
 Small / large garbage. Small is smaller than a cola / beer can, large is everything larger. Small / large graffiti. 
Small is smaller than a sheet of A4 paper, large is everything larger. Vandalism is for example a broken or thrown 
over letterbox or bin, smashed windows or garbage set on fire. 
18
 A maintained house = well done paintwork, bricks and stonework are in good shape, as is the roof. A less than 
maintained house has paintwork flaking off, several missing bricks and / or missing roof tiles etc. 
19
 Maintained paintwork = does not flake off, or needs to be redone. If no paintwork (the frames are of aluminum or 
synthetic), score the maintenance level of that. Also take cleanliness of the paintwork into account. 
20
 Maintained garden = no or little weed, trees and bushed trimmed etc. of the garden that is visible from the street. If 
you score none, all houses have less than maintained gardens, if you score all, all houses have at least a maintained 
garden. 
 None   Some   A lot 
Garbage / litter small17 □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
Garbage / litter large □  □  □  □  □  □  □  
Graffiti small None 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 > 25 
Graffiti large None 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 > 25 
Signs of vandalism None 1 2 3 4 5 > 5 
26 
 
Score list House characteristics 
Address of the house__________________________________________________ 
 
Type of dwelling21 
o Detached house 
o Semi-detached house 
o Row house 
o Apartment building 
o High rise building 
o Other, … 
 
Is the house a corner house 
o Yes 
o No 
 
Number of floors, also include the attic as a floor / don’t include the basement 
o 1 2 3 4 5 6 6+ 
 
If the house is an apartment in a house, or in a high rise building, at which floor is the house / apartment 
situated? 
o No high rise / apartment 
o Ground floor 
o 1st floor  
o 2nd floor 
o 3th floor 
o 4th floor 
o Higher than 4th floor 
o Unknown / Not visible, but not ground floor (for example when the apartment is above a store) 
o Unknown / Not visible 
 
How often do you see …  on / around the house (also include 1 meter in front of the house / garden) 
 
House characteristics: 
Front door visible from the street Yes No    
Front door has glass in it Yes, 
transparent 
Yes, partially 
transparent 
Yes, not 
transparent 
No Front door 
not visible 
Glass panel beside the front door Yes, 
transparent 
Yes, partially 
transparent  
Yes, not 
transparent 
No Front door 
not visible 
Garden at back separated from garden 
at front by a barrier (fencing, hedged, 
house itself) 
Yes No No garden 
(front or back) 
  
 
                                                          
21
 A detached house is at all sides detached from the neighbors, a semi-detached house has one neighbor attached, a 
row house has a neighbor attached at both sides, an apartment building is a row house, or small block with multiple 
dwellings (apartments) in it, a high rise building has multiple floors (4+) with multiple dwellings (apartments) in it. 
22
 Small / large garbage. Small is smaller than a cola / beer can, large is everything larger. Small / large graffiti. 
Small is smaller than a sheet of A4 paper, large is everything larger. Vandalism is for example a broken or thrown 
over letterbox or bin, smashed windows or garbage set on fire. 
Garbage / litter small22 None 1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 > 10 
Garbage / litter large None 1 2 3 4 5 > 5 
Graffiti small None 1 2 3 4 5 > 5 
Graffiti large None 1 2 3 4 5 > 5 
Signs of vandalism None 1 2 3 4 5 > 5 
Observation number: 
Observer:  
Date: ___-___-201_ 
Time: ___u___ 
Weather:  
27 
The state of the house 
 Poor   Average     High 
standard 
What is the maintenance 
level of the paintwork of 
house23 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  
What is the general level of 
the maintenance of the 
house24 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  
How affluent does the house 
look?25 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □  
 
Distance of dwelling to road / pavement (size / depth of the garden) 
o Right on the street (no front garden) 
o < 1 meter  
o 1 – 5 meter  
o 5 – 10 meter 
o > 10 meter 
 
Fencing present 
o No 
o Yes, low fencing (sitting height) 
o Yes, medium fencing (easy to look over) 
o Yes, high fencing  (1.6 meter to 2 meter high) 
o Yes, fortressing (> 2 meter high) 
 
Type of fencing 
o No fencing 
o Can see through 
o Cannot see though, but can see through in winter (not evergreen shrubbery) 
o Cannot see through 
 
Extent of fencing26 
o No fencing 
o Partial fencing 
o Full fencing – where possible (For example: house is right on the street, garden is next to house) 
o Full perimeter fencing 
 
House to house visibility (between front door of the house to the house directly across the street) 
o No house visible from this property 
o Partial house visible from this property 
o Clear visibility of house from this property 
 
Garden condition (4 = Average level of maintenance)27 
o No garden 
                                                          
23
 Average maintained paintwork = does not flake off, or needs to be redone. If no paintwork (the frames are of 
aluminum or synthetic), score the maintenance level of that. Also take cleanliness of the paintwork into account. 
24
 Average maintained house = well done paintwork, bricks and stonework are in good shape, as is the roof. A less 
than maintained house has paintwork flaking off, several missing bricks and / or missing roof tiles etc. 
25
 Affluent looks like they have more than average money to spend. Take size, maintenance and location etc. of the 
house into account. 
26
 Is there fencing between the pavement and the front of the house. If yes, is the fencing around the whole house (or 
garden if it is a row house), or just around a part of the house (or garden if it is a row house). When the house is right 
on the street, full fencing is possible if the garden beside the house has a barrier around the whole house 
27
 Average maintained garden = no or little weed, trees and bushed trimmed etc. of the garden that is visible from the 
street. If you score none, all houses have less than maintained gardens, if you score all, all houses have at least a 
maintained garden. 
28 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Poorly maintained       Maintained to a high standard 
 
Is there a traffic light in sight when you stand right in front of the house? 
o Yes 
o No 
 
How can a car be parked at this house (multiple answers possible) 
o On the driveway / carport 
o In a garage inside the house 
o In a garage attached next to the house 
o In a garage separate from the house 
o On the street in front of the house (allowed and possible without disturbing traffic) 
o Separate parking lot in the street 
o No parking facilities  
 
What is located next to the house 
Left (when facing to the house) 
o Residential house 
o Small retail shops (<2 windows), namely… 
o Large retail shops (>2 windows), namely … 
o Night shop 
o Horeca (bars, restaurants, …), namely … 
o High school 
o School 
o Park / other open area 
o Afforestation (Forest, grassland or small 
public green) 
o Industry 
o Offices 
o Empty space / building ground 
o Not applicable, corner house 
o Other, nl … 
 
Right (when facing to the house) 
o Residential house 
o Small retail shops (<2 windows), namely… 
o Large retail shops (>2 windows), namely … 
o Night shop 
o Horeca (bars, restaurants, …), namely … 
o High school 
o School 
o Park / other open area 
o Afforestation (Forest, grassland or small 
public green) 
o Industry 
o Offices 
o Empty space / building ground 
o Not applicable, corner house 
o Other, nl 
Distance to building next to / closest to the house 
Left (when facing to the house)   
o Attached 
o ½ meter 
o 1-3 meter 
o 3-5 meter 
o 5-10 meter 
o 10+ meter 
o Not applicable, corner house 
 
 
 
 
Right (when facing to the house)  
o Attached 
o ½ meter 
o 1-3 meter 
o 3-5 meter 
o 5-10 meter 
o 10+ meter 
o Not applicable, corner house 
 
29 
Number of pedestrian footpaths / alleys right next to / around the house. Do NOT include pavement 
o None 1 2 3 4 4+ footpaths / alleys 
 
If footpath / alley / park / other open space next to the house 
o No footpath / alley / open space 
o Directly next to the house 
o With low fencing in between 
o With medium to high fencing in between 
o With high fencing in between 
 
Visible security measures present (multiple answers possible) 
□ No 
□ Yes, alarm system 
□ Yes, security camera 
□ Yes, speech intercom 
□ Yes, speech intercom with camera 
□ Yes, climb in security pins at windows or roof gutter 
□ Yes, motion sensor lights 
□ Yes, security bars and barricades 
□ Yes, sign of dog presence, namely dog / dog house / sign ‘beware of the dog’ / other … 
□ Yes, other namely …. 
 
Room for striking comments about the house 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
